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although I will attempt to foreground the precariousness of my position throughout, 
I know such gestures can never suffice. (Spivak, 1988: 271)
what I find useful is the sustained and developing work on the mechanics of the 
constitution of the Other; we can use it to much greater analytic and interventionist 
advantage than invocations of the authenticity of the Other. (Spivak, 1988: 294; 
emphasis in original)
Any response, is inevitably, always already (Althusser, 1971), an 
intra-action entanglement (Barad, 2007). Therefore, my entanglement 
with, the ‘Intimate Others and the Othering of intimates: The gen-
dered psycho-politics of the entangled relational’ (Dalal, 2020) was in 
process before its existence and publication. In this case, the intimate 
Other is you Farhad Dalal (if I may, address you directly, intimately?) 
and your ‘gendered entangled relational with the intimate Other’, 
which is fittingly complex, because I happen to be a woman of colour 
and lesbian. And, yet already, my framing of who I am is fraught with 
problems—problems, which I attempt to explore in this response. For 
example, the terms ‘other’, ‘woman’, ‘colour’ and ‘lesbian’ are terri-
torial in claiming an identity position and differentiation. My claims 
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to an identity position perform an essentialism that is not in keeping 
with my desire for nomadic, fluid boundaries and de-territorialization 
(Braidotti, 1991, 1994, 2011). Within the space of five sentences, I 
find myself slipping habitually into an unhelpful binary of Othering 
based on gender and sexuality, which is ‘structured by a relation of 
negations, and by re-affirming these negations’ (Dolphijn and van der 
Tuin, 2012: 126). However, with all the inherent aporia of holding a 
position, aware that all positions are inevitably ‘implicated’ (Caselli, 
2005: 105) and risking a kind of ‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988: 
280), I do hold a position as an anti-racist feminist, and anti-capitalist 
activist.
The tension I inhabit is of contesting how the idea of difference is 
used as a mechanism of unequal power relations, whilst not resorting 
to the idea of difference as the key to social justice. Indeed, I have 
come to believe that rather than concentrating on the predicaments of 
difference our energies might be put to better use in concentrating on 
the predicaments of positionality. For me, relational entanglement 
revolves around the conundrum of giving an account of oneself 
(Butler, 2005), whilst being held to account, that goes to the heart of 
being in group analysis.
Black feminist intersectionality
My response reflects my Black feminism group analytic standpoint, 
which is simultaneously a marker of my difference to you Farhad, 
and marker of what I bring to the table of ‘breaking bread’ (Hooks 
and West, 1991) with your article and to group analysis generally. 
And yet, this all sounds so reasonable, so measured, so accommodat-
ing and so not in keeping with the ‘ethical distress’ I felt in entering, 
what for me are war zones in your article and indeed in group analy-
sis generally. Here, what I mean is that a Black feminist intersectional 
position would make redundant your self-questioning reflection, 
‘given that I have been writing and thinking about oppression, rac-
ism, marginalization, and so on, for many years, why had I not said 
anything specifically about gender relations?’ (Dalal, 2020: 422). 
However, in every possible orientation and permeation, your ques-
tion, is precisely the problem that Black feminism responds to. The 
point is that oppressive structures and experience such as racism, sex-
ism ‘cannot be treated as “independent variable[s]” because the 
oppression of each is inscribed within the other—is constituted by 
and is constitutive of the other’ (Brah, 1996: 109). The point is that 
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the analysis of gender in your article, and in group analysis in gen-
eral, could do with explicitly embracing the Black feminist theoreti-
cal methodology of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989).
By way of an introduction—call it my hello—I believe we could 
shake hands on the point, you made in one of your books, that 
‘Derrida and Kristeva . . . have yet to penetrate into the syllabuses of 
the analytic trainings’ (Dalal, 2002: 8). In fact, Derrida’s (2000) 
deconstruction of hospitability goes to the heart of the ethical distress 
and ambivalence that you speak of in your article, and, which we all 
experience in group analytic therapy. It would appear that our, no 
easy, task is, ‘thinking as hospitality’ (Friese, 2004:74, emphasis in 
original; Forrest and Nayak, 2020). Moreover, my reading of your 
article brought these words by Kristeva to mind:
Confronting the foreigner whom I reject and with whom at the same time I identify, 
I lose my boundaries, I no longer have a container . . . I lose my composure. I feel 
‘lost’, ‘indistinct’, ‘hazy’. (Kristeva, 1991:187)
In my personal experience, the emotional task of psychic hospitality 
with my internal ‘Intimate Others and the Othering of intimates’ 
(Dalal, 2020) is painfully difficult. My attempts at an emotional 
intersectionality of ‘all my different selves’ (Lorde, 1980:121) 
bumps up against multiple unconscious borders. And, of course, in a 
racist, homo/transphobic capitalist patriarchy, the emotional task of 
intersecting all our different selves is dependent on the socially con-
structed configurations of one’s identity position, privilege and 
power. For example, Farhad, you point out that ‘identities are consti-
tuted out of repudiations of the Other’ (Dalal, 2020: 438). How do I/ 
you/ we offer psychic hospitality to those parts of us that are relent-
lessly repudiated? How do I/ you/ we enable an emotional intersec-
tionality of race, sex, racism, and sexism in a racist sexist world? An 
intersecting dimension of this complexity is that ‘[oppressive] social 
structures create [oppressive] psychic structures’ (Oliver, 2001: 34). 
It is as Foulkes describes: ‘The borderline of what is “in” or “out-
side” is constantly moving . . . there is no clear-cut frontier between 
inside and outside, as little as between reality and phantasy’ (Foulkes, 
1990: 184).
Here, Foulkes offers a useful principle and starting point, however, 
the deconstruction of borderlines between inside/internal and out-
side/external is highly political. Under the lens of intersectionality, 
‘the political is psychological; the psychological is political’ (Dalal, 
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2020: 425) is precisely because ‘the intersectional experience is 
greater than the sum of racism and sexism’ (Crenshaw, 1989:140). 
Here the words ‘greater than’ is the heart of intersectionality because 
it is within the intra-dependency of difference, that the radical poten-
tial of intra-action can be realized (Barad, 2014). Note that the suffix 
‘intra’ (‘intra-dependency’ and ‘intra-action’) rather than ‘inter’ can 
be used to express the indeterminate reach of entanglement which is 
‘greater than’ any configuration that adds or subtracts dimensions of 
difference. It seems to me that the radical political potential of group 
analysis is in the exploration of the intra-sectional intra-actions of the 
group dynamics and matrix. Thus, we could think of the group matrix 
as an ‘[intra]communicational, [intra]actional network’ (Foulkes, 
1990: 231).
Farhad, an inter/intra-sectional lens, would trouble your statement 
that ‘the potential to be blind is gendered’ (Dalal, 2020: 441); empha-
sis in original) and your argument that the different ‘psycho-socio-
developmental process’ of men and women: ‘results in women being 
more in touch with the feeling realm, and as we know, feelings con-
nect. Consequently it is more difficult for women to blind themselves 
to the humanity of suffering others’ (Dalal, 2020).
Notwithstanding your acknowledgement that you only refer to 
‘heterosexuality, and not made mention of the possibility of other 
gender identities’ (Dalal, 2020: 430), and to the importance of other 
dimensions of differentiation (i.e race and class), the problem is you 
keep resorting to essentialist representations of man/men/masculinity 
and woman/women/femininity. Is essentialism a way of managing 
ambivalence?
The Black feminist, lesbian activist Audre Lorde, explains the 
complexity of emotional intersectionality in the following way:
I have always known I learn my most lasting lessons about difference by closely 
attending the ways in which the differences inside me lie down together. (Lorde, 
1988: 117–118)
I am not one piece of myself. I cannot be simply a Black person and not be a 
woman too, nor can I be a woman without being a lesbian . . . there have always 
been people in my life, who will come to me and say, ‘Well, here, define yourself 
as such and such’, to the exclusion of the other pieces of myself. There is an 
injustice to self in doing this. (Evans, 1979: 72)
to lie down with the different parts of ourselves, so that we can in fact learn to 
respect and honour the different parts of each other so that we in fact can learn how 
to use them. (Abod, 1987:158)
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I can say that for me, trying to sustain the task of emotional intersec-
tionality across the different parts of myself is excruciatingly diffi-
cult. My unconscious defences function like military border patrol 
warding off unbearable foreigner parts of myself and whether I name 
it as ‘an attack on linking’ (Bion, 1959), ‘psychic retreats’ (Steiner, 
1993), or ‘phobic object’ blind spots (Cooper, 1997); the effect is of 
marshalling military mindedness to control my internal psychic war-
zone. It seems to me that any account of ‘The gendered psycho-poli-
tics of the entangled relational’ (Dalal, 2020) needs to be an 
intersectional account, and by this I mean where the Black feminist 
theoretical methodology of intersectionality is explicit named and 
used. Farhad you state that,
In sum, I am using the term ‘entangled relational’ to highlight the messy psycho-
political processes which are integral to the relational. One consequence of the 
entanglement is that I cannot address gender without getting entangled in multiple 
issues like race, class, sexuality, politics and so on. (Dalal, 2020: 425)
My response is to ask, why do you not name the Black feminist con-
cept of intersectionality in this article? My question is a political 
question based on the fact that, ‘[t]he shadow obscuring this complex 
Black women’s intellectual tradition is neither accidental nor benign’ 
(Hill Collins, 2000: 3).
Warzones
Farhad, it is no coincidence that the ethical distress you felt in your 
exploration of the disintegration of matter, of who you are as matter, 
of bordered thinking, of position and representation of gendered mat-
ter, found symbolic expression through a vast violent geo-political 
cartography of fragmented, conflict ridden warzones incorporating 
Israel and the Palestinian question; conflict zones of Northern 
Ireland, Bosnia, Rwanda; waring relations between India, Pakistan 
and China; Vietnam; Soweto; USA; the UK; ancient Greece, Persian 
and Byzantium empires; and Mars and Venus. Farhad, it is no coin-
cidence that your ethical distress finds symbolic representation in the 
dehumanization of militarization that legitimates rape, genocide, 
holocaust, mutilation, disenfranchisement, abduction, torture, and 
murder. Your references to domestic violence, suicide and the deten-
tion centres that hold asylum seekers are not happenstance. I suggest 
that for all of us the idea and experience of nomadic disintegration of 
identity and dissolution of the boundaries of our knowing self is the 
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ethical distress of entanglement with others, here I include all matter 
as an entangled.
My experience of intra-acting with the particles of your article and 
the process of enunciating my response causes an embodied ethical 
distress that resonates symbolically with entering a socio-political 
context of conflict; in this case, the context of your article. To be 
clear, my ethical distress is conjured both by the content and the 
method of your article. In terms of content, group analysis requires an 
understanding of militarized psyches and needs to engage with the 
political content of militarized violations of human rights, and abuses 
of power. However, in terms of method, there is something about 
your way of negotiating the gendered psycho-politics of the entan-
gled relational that jarred. For example, on the one hand there is the 
call to assemblages of intra-acting complex multiplicity evidenced in 
your ‘prompt and reminder, to myself as much as to the reader: that 
in whatever I might say about others, I will somehow also be saying 
something about myself’ (Dalal, 2020: 424). Whilst, on the other hand, 
the intersectionality of intra-dependent, indeterminate, fluidity is 
disavowed; Farhad, you repeatedly use essentialist representations of 
women’s position, women’s qualities, and developmental experi-
ence. For example, the intersectional experience of being the Black 
daughter of white mother, and/or white mother who maybe overtly 
racist, would not fit with your statement that:
Females being of the same gender as the mother do not have to establish their 
gender identity against that of her mother. Consequently, the girls’ early experience 
is that of continuity and similarity with the result that they have a more relational 
connection to the world. (Dalal, 2020: 428)
There is a problem with asserting gender as a primary site of continu-
ity and similarity. Although you acknowledge ‘power relations that 
drive gender relations are inextricable from those that drive class and 
race relations’ (Dalal, 2020: 427), and say that ‘one cannot talk about 
one (gender) without getting entangled with various other kinds of 
othering processes’ (Dalal, 2020: 427), you proceed to speak about 
women through the single lens of gender. The problem is that, ‘[w]ith 
gender as the central concept in feminist thinking, epistemology is 
flattened out in such a way that we lose sight of the complex and 
multiple ways in which the subject and object of possible experience 
are constituted . . . There’s no inquiry into the knowing subject 
beyond the fact of being a “woman” ‘(Alarcón, 1990:361).
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Quantum entanglements (Barad, 2010)
Farhad, you explain that:
the term ‘entangled’ is drawn from quantum physics, where . . . a subatomic 
particle in one place in the universe is instantaneously and mysteriously affected 
by what happens to another particle in another place . . . ‘entangled’ in the quantum 
realm, is analogous to the notion of the ‘entangled relational’ in the human realm. 
(Dalal, 2020: 425)
Here your use of quantum physics to think about the entangled rela-
tional echoes new materialist and post-humanist approaches to entan-
glement (Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012). However, Farhad, I must 
ask, and the question is political; why have you not referenced the 
long-standing development of these emancipatory frameworks? In an 
article on the gendered psycho-politics of the entangled relational, 
why do you not cite the relevance and significant scholarship of the 
feminist new materialist, post-humanist theory of women such as 
Karen Barad and Rosi Braidotti and Donna Haraway? Is this an 
expression of your ambivalence?
Haraway and Barad’s use of diffraction in quantum physics focuses 
on diffraction of difference rather than reflection or mirroring of dif-
ference (Barad, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2010; Haraway, 1988, 2003, 
2008). Feminist new materialist, post-humanist elucidations of dif-
fraction provokes a challenge to the emphasis in group analysis on 
mirroring as a frame of reference for understanding group dynamics 
(Birchmore, 2015; Foulkes,1964). Haraway explains that:
diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, 
difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike 
reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less 
distorted form, thereby giving rise to industries of metaphysics. Rather, diffraction 
can be a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness. (Haraway, [1997] 
2018: 273)
Perhaps the complexity of diffraction within the analysis of your arti-
cle, and within group analysis in general, would be enhanced by 
inclusion of a more diverse range of analytic lenses. In other words, 
inclusion of a critical consciousness that comes from interference 
from the intra-action lens of intersectional difference. For example, 
whilst Jessica Benjamin, Nancy Chodorow, Judith Butler, and Lynne 
Layton are fine scholars in their own right (Dalal, 2020), I could not 
help but note that they are all white. It seems to me that there is a 
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general marginalization, within psychoanalysis and group analysis of 
scholars in the field who are women of colour. Here, I am thinking of 
Margaret Morgan Lawrence, Dorothy Holmes, Kimberlyn Leary, 
Hortense Spillers, Claudia Tate, Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, Ranjana 
Khanna and Gail Lewis to name but a few. Whilst the marginalization 
of women in patriarchy is problematic, the complexity is that not all 
women are positioned in the margins in the same way. Audre Lorde 
puts it well when she says,
in a patriarchal power system where white skin privilege is a major prop, the 
entrapments used to neutralize Black women and white women are not the same. 
(Lorde, 1980: 118)
To imply, however, that all women suffer the same oppression simply because we 
are women is to lose sight of the many varied tools of patriarchy. It is to ignore how 
those tools are used by women without awareness against each other. (Lorde, 
1979a: 67)
Psycho-politics of entangled relations: Two-fold difficulties
It seems to me that the inherent tensions of intersectional psycho-
politics of entangled relations are least twofold. Firstly, any account 
of myself in relation to your account of yourself is skewed because 
my/our view is produced by where and how we are positioned. As 
Haraway says: ‘The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never 
finished . . . Vision requires instruments of vision; an optics is a 
politics of positioning. Instruments of vision mediate standpoints’ 
(Haraway, 1988: 586).
Being a fidgety kind of woman, I am continually trying out differ-
ent lenses and my perspective and in turn my position is always on 
the move; I am forever in transition because all particles of all matter 
are forever in transition a sort of internal disorientating diaspora. The 
Suryia in the moment to moment process of creating this response is 
a different Suryia to the Suryia you, or anyone else, will encounter if 
you read it and by the same logic, the Farhad of your article, to whom 
I am responding, is a different Farhad now. Here, I am reminded of 
Derrida’s (1977) example of the shopping list, where both the writer 
of the shopping list (or any written text) and the other who re-reads 
the shopping list (or any written text) are at once both positioned as 
present/absent, sender/receiver. Shifting the frame from text to the 
speech act, is this not precisely what we are grappling with in group 
analytic practice (where all members of the group are in a practice)? 
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Within and between group sessions, members of the group are simul-
taneously present/absent, sender/receiver to self, each other and to 
the group.
Secondly, the nub of an ethical response to ethical distress is ‘the 
experience of the impossible’ (Spivak, 1995: np); shown in the fol-
lowing questions: If I/we are always ‘in motion, in transition, in move-
ment’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000: 373), how do I/we hold each other to 
account, in terms of power, privilege and position? Do I wait patiently 
and forgivingly for you to recognize the alterity of women’s marginal-
ity? Women’s intersectional marginality is an URGENT issue. We 
cannot wait around. ‘We cannot pivot the centre. We cannot be moder-
ate’ (Davis, 2016: 145). Farhad, I suggest that the absence of the Black 
feminist concept of intersectionality and disavowal of feminist new 
materialism and post-humanism is pivotal to you pivoting the centre. 
I suggest that your reliance on essentialist constructions of gender is, 
at the very least, an expression of being moderate.
In the situation, where, we are both/all implicated in the oppressive 
language and social constructions that we use to try to deconstruct 
oppressive language and social constructions, with what tools do we 
hold each other to account? Is ‘there a possibility of ‘the transforma-
tion of silence into language and action’ (Lorde, 1977:40) ‘in the con-
dition of the impossibility of language?’ (Nayak, 2015: xiii). Herein 
lies the ethical distress of giving an account of oneself whilst holding 
each other to account (Butler, 2005). It is as Butler describes: ‘I tell a 
story about the relations I choose, only to expose, somewhere along 
the way, the way I am gripped and undone by these very relations . . 
. Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other’ (Butler, 2004: 23).
We are both/all undone by ‘The gendered psycho-politics of the 
entangled relational’. The point is that if we bear it, if we dare to 
inhabit the space of being ‘undone by each other’, this is the site of 
subversive productivity. Braidotti explains the challenge of the task: 
‘Dis-identification involves the loss of cherished habits of thought 
and representation, a move that can also produce fear and a sense of 
insecurity and nostalgia’ (Dolphijn, van der Tuin, 2012: 35).
However, if my/your/our response to the ethical distress of being 
undone is to fall back on essentialisms, we would do well to heed the 
Black feminist caution that: ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle 
the master’s house’ (Lorde, 1979b:112; emphasis in original).
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